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The Asian Newly Industrialized





1 The  Asian  newly  industrialized  economies  (NIE's),  namely  Hong  Kong,  South  Korea,
Singapore and Taiwan are attracting world-wide attention for five layers of reasons:
1. There is quasi-unanimity in recognizing them as success stories in industrial development
and economic growth.
2. They are being discussed and they consider themselves as conceivable members of the OECD
or an OECD-like organisation in the Pacific region.
3. They  constitute  an  implicit,  if  not  yet  fully  articulated  challenge  to  less  performing
countries and regions, such as the Soviet Union and Latin America.
4. They invite intellectual anticipation of the conceivable outcome of Deng's and Gorbatchev's
modernisation efforts in the two great Communist economies1.
5. They are recognized by some, but by no means all members of the academic community, as
part of a new Pacific power center with Japan as its center2, and in potential competition
with the North American, Soviet and Western European power centers in an increasingly
multipolar world.
2 Inevitably,  the question arises what precisely these "four tigers" have in common to
explain such an outstanding performance.  Given the wide array of  salient  structural
differences between the Four, the task of finding an answer to that question is far from
The Asian Newly Industrialized Economies: A Universal Model of Action
Civilisations, 40-1 | 1991
1
easy.  It  requires  readiness  to  cut  across  familiar  cleavages  of  economic  theory  and
political doctrines.
3 Much of the empirical material of the economic histories of the Four in the past two or
three decades is well known and I do not intend to reproduce it here in any detail. Just to
put their performance in perspective, let look at the following figures:
• The Asian NIEs averaged yearly growth rates of 10 % from 1965 to 1973, just above Japan's
rate and more than double that of all other OECD countries.
• The average for the following fourteen years from 1973 to 1987 during which growth rates
everywhere declined drastically, still reached 7,7 %, two times that of Japan and three times
that of the OECD as a whole.
• In 1987 the Four achieved a combined current account surplus of US $ 30 billion contrasting
starkly with the US $ 5 billion deficit of the EC without Germany's US $ 45 billion surplus.
• Their share of world trade in manufactured goods increased from 4 % in 1975 to 11 % in
1987, just short of the share of each of the three leaders in world exports, the US, West
Germany and Japan.
• With a share of 8 % in US imports, Taiwan alone has overtaken West Germany (5 %) in the
rank list of America's most important trading partners coming up behind Canada and Japan!
4 So far the perspective. Table 1 gives an overview of the importance of trade for the NIES.
But the challenging problem is not to describe that performance, but to explain it.
5 What I would like to propose is a model of action. I submit that only on the level of
analysis of economic policy action, both private and public policy, both corporate and
government action, can we find:
• what is common to the Four,
• what distinguishes them from less performing economies,
• what, hence, prima facie explains their own outstanding performance, and, finally,
• what may serve as a normative prescription to other countries or as an analytical tool for
predicting outcomes of modernisation efforts elsewhere.
6 This  is  not  to  deny  the  importance  of  structures  in  the  four  newly  industrialised
economies:
7 There are societal structures and economic structures, there are macrostructures and
microstructures, there are structures based on culture and structures that are merely the
consolidated result of political regimes and/or past economic policies. More particularly,
the Four share a fundamentally conservative political culture and, most interestingly,
this is a point they have in common with Japan, in many aspects considered it their
model. The political culture in question is no doubt distinguished by three features:
1. a comparative strength of the traditional family;
2. a  basically  unquestioned  vitality  of  the  social  function  of  religion,  be  it  Buddhism,
Confucianism or Christianity;
3. dynamic fusions of corporatism, bureaucracy and capitalism casting doubt on Max Weber's
sociology of religion and suggesting the religious and ideological pluralism of the capitalist
world3.
8 One could point out that there is much dedication to traditional family, an unquestioned
acceptance of the social function of religion, a rather more unbridled capitalism, as well
as a sometimes pervasive influence of corporatist structures in Latin America as well.
Classical Chinese, French, Prussian and Japanese bureaucracies share comparable legal
structures and traditional ideals. Central European and Japanese corporatism have much
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in common4.  Taiwan's  neoclassical  policy of  competition is  closer to West  Germany's
ordo-liberal  policy  than  to  the  fair  trade  regime of  any  other  country5.  Hongkong's
laissez-faire regime is perhaps the only application of 18th century Scottish liberalism
surviving in the world. The list of confusing structural comparisons could be continued.
9 In order to overcome this confusion I shall proceed in two steps: First I shall define the
model  of  action  that  makes  the  experience  of  the  four  Asian  newly  industrialised
economies universally relevant (Section 2). Secondly, I shall refer to some of the most
commonly accepted empirical material of the economic history of the four tigers and
discuss how it fits the model of action (Section 3).
 
II. The Model of Action
10 I submit five propositions, which, taken together, should serve to cut the gordian knot of
structural  diversity and common performance among the Asian NIE'S.  They shift  the
discussion to the level of analysis of the philosophy of science, but again, only on that
level  can  we  discover  the  global  significance  of  the  performance  of  the  newly
industrialised economies. These propositions were developed to explain the case of Japan6
. But they are of equal relevance to the "four tigers":
 
Proposition One
11 In order to explain economic performance, a crucial distinction must be made, which all
explanations of the success of the "four tigers" have failed to make so far: the distinction
between action and structure.  Experts  on China,  Korea and South-East  Asia have for
centuries been focusing on the perceived unique societal structures of the countries in
question.  Even  today  they  tend  to  treat  economic  policy  action  evolving  in  the
environment of these Asian societies more or less as part of those structures. Since such
culturally determined structures cannot be transplanted elsewhere, the economic policies
that come along with them, as it were, cannot be emulated by policy-makers of other
societies, is then the more or less implicit assumption.
12 Economists  of  the  current  mainstream  persuasion,  on  the  contrary,  focus  on  the
application of general equilibrium theory to the cases under study, are uninterested in
both structures and economic policy action and quite consequently do not recognize the
problem of interaction between structure and action. We argue that there are systems of
action that can function in more than one societal environment, and that the economic
policies of governments and corporations of the "four tigers", in spite of all differences,
constitute precisely such a system of action. The differences are differences in degree and
concrete configuration, but not in kind. There is, of course, interaction between structure
and action. This is not limited to one-way causation but operates both ways. Economic
policies  can bring about  structural  change.  When pursued over  the  long term,  their
effects can be consolidated to become,  in turn,  new structures.  This is  true both for
developing and so-called "mature" economies.
 
Proposition Two
13 Although  the  newly  industrialised  Asian  economies,  their  societies  and  cultures  are
unquestionably as unique as those of any other country in this pluralistic world, they
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contain many more components comparable to one or the other Asian or "Western"
economy, society or culture than is generally assumed even by representatives of the
general equilibrium approach to economic theory. In fact, there is hardly a component in
the "four tigers" performance, both in terms of action and in terms of structure, that
cannot be explained by some "Western" theory or concept.  Only the concrete mix of
these  components  is  unique  to  each  of  the  four  economies.  They  are  what  we  call
"incomparable compositions of comparable components".
 
Proposition Three
14 Of the three types of explanation recognized by the philosophy of science, the causal one
as  in  the physical  sciences,  the intentional  one as in the rational  choice  theories  of
mainstream  economics,  and  the  functional  one  as  in  evolution  theory  in  various
disciplines, only the last-mentioned is adequate to deal with that challenge. The ex ante
explanatory power of functionalist theory in the social sciences is debatable7. But there is
no way to avoid it, whenever the question is asked ex post, why one mature economy
performed better or worse than other mature economies. Many may not realize it, when
they  ask  that  question,  but  it  is,  of  course,  a  functionalist  one8.  One  advantage  of
functional  explanation  is  that  it  is  more  inclusive  than  both  causal  and  intentional
methodologies, and, more particularly, does rely on these two wherever possible. An old-
fashioned  and  much-decried  set  of  concepts,  namely  Talcott  Parsons'  functionalist
framework  of  adaptation,  goal  attainment,  pattern  maintenance  and  integration9 is
surprisingly  helpful  in  distinguishing  true  from spurious  disagreements  between the
general  equilibrium  approach,  the  structural  explanations,  and  the  "statist"  or
mercantilist interpretations of Asian economies.
15 There is  at  least one of today's contending schools of  thought about Asian economic
performance for each of Parsons' functional requirements. In fact, general equilibrium
theories and the "Austrian" school deal with "adaptation", the theory of economic policy
and the neomercantilist paradigm with "goal attainment", structural approaches with
"pattern maintenance", and decision-making analyses with "integration". The problem
with these  contending approaches  is  that  some of  them assume to  have a  complete
explanation of performance or normative prescription for policy, while in fact they are
engaged in an unintended division of labour. The enormous epistemological merit of the
Japanese case is to show how such a division of labour actually works. The performance of
the "four tigers" in emulating the Japanese model suggests the necessity of such division
of labour in these cases as well.
 
Proposition Four
16 18th century "laissez-faire" liberalism is not the only political regime in which critical
rationalism can flourish, as Karl Popper10, and with him the "Austrian School"11, strongly
feel. Popper and Hayek might feel vindicated by the survival of Hong Kong's laissez-faire
economy, society, and political system. But among the Asian economies it is the only one
to have such a system. On the other hand, Japanese economic policy-makers have not
only  demonstrated  over  the  past  two  decades  that  this  most Western  of  all
epistemological  approaches can be practiced with great benefit,  even in an as highly
structured political and economic system as Japan's. It is in this very area where they
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have outperformed their Western counterparts most strikingly. South Korea, Taiwan and
Singapore each occupy a different position in the spectrum of societal  and economic
organisation  between  the  Japanese  and  Hong  Kong  ideal  types.  But  their  economic
policies  are inspired by the same readiness  to invest,  innovate and adjust,  the same
Schumpeterian dynamism, the same preparedness to discard fallible theories, in short,
the same critical rationalism.
 
Proposition Five
17 From the four preceding propositions we conclude what could serve as the best line of
Asian defence against American trade recriminations: Asian policy-makers have applied
more thoroughly than their American colleagues an American philosophy, the philosophy
of pragmatism. Pragmatism is the most important common cultural value and, moreover
national, virtue of the U.S. and East Asia, and it is not by chance that the American and
Asian economies can also boast the most dynamic performance, in global comparison, of
the past  two decades.  Europe,  which throughout  its  history seems to  have been too
preoccupied with dogmas to ever develop a lively pragmatic tradition, would be well
advised to realize  this  combined American and East  Asian potential.  Such awareness
could  help  to  overcome  the  doctrinal  battles  between  British  Thatcherism,  French
dirigisme, German ordo-liberalism, Keynesian demand management industrial policy on
the supply side, monetarist limitation to money-supply control, free-trade idealism and
protectionist realism. Latin America, if it wishes to emulate the "four Asian tigers" must
strive  to  rid  itself  of  the  excessive  practice  of  doctrines  received,  during  its  post-
Columbian history, from Europe, from Spanish absolutism, over the liberal revolution,
untrammelled  capitalism,  and  quasi-feudal  oligarchy,  to  the  Marxist  revolution.
Hopefully, the trend towards democracy that has seized Latin America will prepare that
region  intellectually  for  pragmatic  approaches  to  economic development,  based  on
gradual elimination of social disequilibria, socialization of know-how, and integration of
communities of different ethnic origin. Pragmatism appears to be the therapy Deng and
Gorbachev are trying to administer to the two great ailing economies of the communist
world, though with different results,  and all of a sudden, Marxist revolutionaries and
conservative doctrinarians alike are deprived of their enemies.
18 The rejection of a system of "great truths" governing all human activity is the "positive"
substance of Charles Pierce's, William James' and John Dewey's philosophical pragmatism
12.  Strictly  speaking,  it  is  not  a  philosophy,  but  a  technique  for  the  solution  of
philosophical, scientific, economic and political problems. Theories are put in the service
of practice case by case in pursuit of tentative goals. The recognition of uncertainty is as
important to pragmatism as it is to critical rationalism. The eclectic use of theories (even
deterministic  ones,  but  without  their  deterministic  ambition)  is  common  both  to
pragmatism and to Parsonian functionalism.
19 Asia's pragmatic policy-makers have managed to combine conventional economic policy
seeking  incremental  results  in  an  assumed  general  equilibrium  framework,  and
comprehensive "visions" aiming at more than incremental structural change. Moreover,
in addition to aggregate methodology in fiscal and monetary policies of the Keynesian
type, we find a surprising degree of methodological individualism13 not only in the action
of  private  "Schumpeterian"  entrepreneurs,  but  also  in  that  of  "visionary"  industrial
policy-makers of the Japanese type. Both categories of actors have had no difficulty in
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making  the  often  neglected  distinction  between  political  and  methodological
individualism, and were thus never inhibited by Popper's,  Schumpeter's,  and Hayek's
aversion against economic policy-making of any kind on the macro-level. They seem to be
like  Popper's  "piecemeal  engineers"14,  trying  their  best  to  influence  the  otherwise
autonomous course of Parsons' great "moving equilibrium". This equilibrium is a societal
one. It includes Pareto's (static) economic equilibrium, but subjects it to the "movement"
resulting from the interaction between economy, society, and culture.
20 Economic  policy-makers  of  this  type  stand out  for  their  always-maintained  sense  of
direction. In that sense their policy-making can be called strategic. But their strategy is
not dictated by doctrine. As true pragmatists, they derive their sense of direction from
the  nature  of  the  changing  problems to  be  solved.  My husband and I  have  labelled
Japanese  policy-making  of  this  type  "strategic  pragmatism15.  The  model  of  action of
newly industrialised economies is the same.
 
III. Explaining the Asian Performance
21 There are two ways to make plain how easily the available empirical material of the Asian
newly  industrialised  economies  falls  into  the  categories  of  the  five  propositions  just
stated.
• The first is to compile the components that are obviously comparable. This compilation
shows that there are not one, but several theories that can claim Asian compliance. If their
explanatory or normative ambition is to be recognized fully, they cannot prevail at the same
time. The result is a powerful suggestion of the functional quality of pragmatic policy-
making, both private and public. I will attempt such a compilation, although a very
summary one, presently.
• But I will then proceed to a second, more structured way of organising the empirical
material by trying to subsume it under the four Parsonian functions of adaptation, goal
attainment, integration, and pattern maintenance. This approach is helpful in showing that
a division of labour is possible between the conflicting theories, that functional holism and
critical rationalism are indeed compatible.
 
1. Pragmatic cuts across doctrines
22 At  least  five  components  are  common  to  the  four  economies  that  are  the  first  to
overcome the Asian Drama,  which Gunnar  Myrdal  had considered almost  unsolvable
twenty years ago16. A strong suggestion that the five components have something to do
with  that  performance  can  be  derived  from  their  presence  in  the  case  of  Japan's
modernisation process since the Meiji restorations. The suggestion is all the stronger, as
it is often said that the Asian NIEs are following the Japanese model, and might in the
predictable future outperform Japan in sectors in which Japan plays a leading role:
23 The first component is active government involvement in economic goal setting and a
non-ideological  acceptance  of  that  role  by  private  enterprises.  There  is  no  Asian
inscrutability  involved  in  this  component.  Indeed,  one  can  refer  to  Alexander
Gerschenkron's  "theory  of  backwardness", which  he  developed  from the  economic
history of continental Europe17. The more backward an economy, the theory states, the
more active the role of government in the initial kick and subsequent spurt of economic
development. The theory has the merit of recalling that there were times when European
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economies such as the German one were themselves developing economies, and that as
recently  as  the  nineteenth century.  Harvard's  Charles  Kindleberger  who,  like  hardly
anyone  else,  combines  authority  in  neoclassical  theory  with  profound  knowledge  of
European  economic  history,  has  the  merit  of  having  saved  the  legitimacy  of  active
pragmatic government involvement even for mature economies in his "theory of the
Second Best", which relies on markets as long as markets function efficiently, but which
advocates government involvement whenever they do not18.
24 On the scale of comparative intensity of government involvement, South Korea ranks
without any doubt highest among the Four. In the Gerschenkron approach, it is the one of
the Four that comes closest to the Japanese model.  Hong Kong ranks lowest,  but the
Crown  Colony's  government  was  active  nonetheless,  most  recently  with  a  support
program for Hong Kong's electronics industry, which was showing signs of loosing out
against Taiwanese and Korean competition. To be sure, this unexpected spur of Hong
Kong government's activism was certainly more inspired by the more modest theory of
Second Best than by the more radical theory of backwardness. Singapore and Taiwan
occupy the middle with a sustained Gerschenkron type approach qualified by strong and
progressive attachment to general equilibrium theory.
25 The second component, related to the first, but with sectoral limitations, is more or less
reluctant mercantilism in foreign trade policy in all four countries19:
26 There has been, and still is, infant industry protection as advocated even in neoclassical
models of international trade. The instruments vary
• from tariffs, non-tariff barriers and preferential access to credit and foreign exchange in
Taiwan and Korea,
• to the establishment of state-owned enterprises in Singapore and Taiwan,
• and to technological support programs in Korea, Taiwan, and most recently, Hong Kong.
27 There has been currency undervaluation and thus export promotion in all four countries
over prolonged periods, and it matters little whether it was guided, or not, by purposeful
neomercantilist  "beggar-thy-neighbour"  motivation.  There  is,  in  any  case,  a  striking
difference to the protectionism that prevailed over most of the 1970s and 1980s in Latin
America. As exemplified by Paul Prebisch's thinking, the Latin American dogma was to
insulate developing countries from trade with industrialized countries altogether. The
Asian  NIEs  have  indeed  protected  their  infant  industries  against  imports  from
industrialised  countries,  but  at  the  same time they have  engaged wholeheartedly  in
exports of manufactured goods, even export-led macroeconomic growth on a massive
scale.  Their  success  is  thus largely derived from participation in the world economy
rather than from decoupling.
28 The  third  component  is  a  dynamic  free  market  economy,  with  applications  of  the
Austrian school of economics long forgotten in North America and Europe under the
dominance of  Keynesian and neoclassical  economics.  Schumpeter's  theories  of  forced
savings, investment, innovation and business cycle have all been put to practice in the
Asian NIEs as in Japan by generalist businessmen, bankers and industrial policy- makers
mostly unaware of the theoretical recovery they were making:
 
Saving
29 In the inflationary phases of the 1960s and 1970s "Schumpeterian entrepreneurs" were
regularly "overborrowing" and "overinvesting", securing from credit-creating banks or
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from the state the funds necessary to raid the circular flow of goods and services, forcing
the economy to save by inflation ("forced saving"). Only Korea resorted to the massive
capital imports that in the Harrod-Domar model of economic development are supposed
to precede growth in developing countries. Taiwan has, like Japan before it, endeavoured
to control its external debt and relied more on domestic savings. Singapore and Hong
Kong, after the war, focused on the development of an efficient and free capital market in
addition to indirect finance. What was common to all four Asian NIEs as to Japan was a
widely above-average saving rate of private households that allowed their economies to
proceed on a path of comparatively high growth even after inflation abated in the 1980s




30 Schumpeterian  entrepreneurs  were  able  to  continue  making  more  than  incremental
investment decisions, climbing up at a high pace the scale of value-added production,
vigorously entering global competition in marketing of new products, participating in the
Schumpeterian supply-push innovation led by Japan20.
 
Business cycles
31 Rather than on short-term cycles of Keynesian demand, entrepreneurs and governments
of  the  Four  focused  on  seizing  the  opportunities  of  medium-  and  long-term  cycles
resulting from technological  change of  the Schumpeterian type.  The most prominent
example  is  their  active  participation  in  the  so-called  "second  industrial  revolution"
provoked by the application of microelectronics to commercial products marketed on a
global scale.
32 The fourth comparable component is the presence of factors essential for stable growth
according to neoclassical theory. Stability of government, maintenance of competition in
a  basically  market-oriented  economy,  population  increase,  import  of  technology,
exploitation of comparative advantage, labour mobility and improvement of labour are
factors that have all been common to the Asian NIEs.
33 The fifth component is that although the political regimes in power in the four countries
just  as  in  Japan  are  unmistakably  conservative21,  they  have  developed  a  remarkable
ability to prevent or diffuse the potential of social conflict inherent, according to almost
any historical record, to processes of rapid industrialization. The conservatism of these
political  regimes has obviously been a creative one,  to use T.J.  Pempel's  formula for
Japan's political culture. Social disequilibria, although certainly present, were much less
conspicuous, exacerbated and sanctioned by religion, fatalism or doctrine, than in Latin
America for example. There has been a remarkable degree of openness of opportunity
and a  rapid  process  of  income equalisation in  all  the  four  economies.  In  Korea,  the
spreading benefits  of  a  highly  performing capitalist  economy have doubtless  had an
emancipatory  effect  and  explain  a  large  part  of  the  successful  drive  towards
democratization. A similar process appears to be on the verge of success in Taiwan.
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2. Functional Holism and Critical Rationalism
34 Just as general equilibrium theory in classical economics is not meant to describe any real
economy,  the  moving  equilibrium  resulting  from  the  interaction  of  Parsons'  four
functions is not intended to describe any real society. Admittedly, Parsons' theory is not
easily falsified by empirical testing, and therefore, does not live up to the standard of a
true  theory  in  Popper's  epistemology.  It  shares  this  defect,  however,  with  general
equilibrium theory. Moreover, the difficulty is not due to a lack of deductive quality but
to the level of generality of sociological functionalism. On the other hand it is far from
unthinkable  to  try  to  falsify  Parsons'  theory  even  on  the  level  of  social  systems  in
national  aggregates.  Parsons'  theory  would  be  falsified  if  it  could  be  proved  that  a
particular society has survived over time despite consistent lack of any one of the four
Parsonian functional requirements.
35 Some might point to the Soviet Union or other Communist countries that have survived
under that form of organization notwithstanding the high degree of adaptive dysfunction
in the Pareto sense that has become an axiom of the Soviet economy. On the other hand,
one might consider Gorbachev's efforts at "glasnost" and "perestroika" as well as Deng's
modernisation drive, as dramatic recognitions of that adaptive dysfunction and thus as
one  of  the  most  persuasive  confirmations  of  the  relevance  of  Parson's  functionalist
approach. Similar dysfunctions can easily be found on the other end of the ideological
spectrum in Latin American economies dominated by conservative oligarchies.
36 But short of outright collapse of any one of the individual societies of the developed or
developing world, we do recognize salient differences in economic performance, policy
implementation, maintenance of cultural patterns, and societal integration. Obviously,
there is a plurality of states of balance at which Parsons' "moving equilibrium" can be
achieved.  Allowing  for  that  plurality  does  not  mean  immunizing  the  theory  to
epistemological  insignificance.  Rather than relegating such differences to the "ceteris
paribus" proposition reserved for "extraneous" factors as general equilibrium theories
tend to do, we might usefully try to trace them to Parsonian functions or dysfunctions.
We feel all the more encouraged to do so, since as explained above, there are remarkable
degrees of congruence between established, though competing, academic paradigm and




37 The capability of a social  system to survive and adapt to its given environment goes
beyond  passive  acceptance  of  external  conditions.  It  rests  more  particularly  on  the
productive potential of the economy. There are, of course, various levels of analysis and
generality determining the understanding of that most difficult Parsonian function. On
the level of the society as a whole, the adaptation function is assumed by the economic
subsystem. Parsons accepts classical economic theory for this subsystem and treats it as
being  governed  by  autonomous  market  forces  and  by  general  equilibrium  in  the
Marshall-Pareto tradition22.
38 Since economic theory in the classical tradition deemphasises government policy there is
no  need  for  Parsons  to  distinguish  between  the  levels  of  analysis  of  action  and  of
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structure.  For  arguments  sake,  I  will  follow Parsons'  for  a  moment  in  this  classical
understanding of the economy.
39 In this sense, the four Asian NIEs stand out for their adaptive achievements since the war.
As the structure of international trade changed, so did the structure of NIEs' exports:
from transhipping activities to light manufacturing in textiles, toys, footwear and then
electronics, in the case of Singapore and Hong Kong; from agrarian economy to heavy
industry like steel, petrochemicals, shipbuilding, auto-making, mining, and up the ladder
of added-value to ever more high tech components of the electronics industry in Korea
and Taiwan. Exporters of all four countries have consistently endeavoured to invest in
sectors  with  the  highest  growth  potential  globally.  All  this  can  be  explained  with
apparent ease in terms of the classical theory of trade, division of labour, and evolving
comparative  advantage.  Table  2  serves  as  a  suggestive  survey  of  the  economic
development of the Asian NIEs in the classical sense.
40 However, there is another level of analysis for the adaptive function which goes beyond
general equilibrium theory and concerns the real-world environment of a society, namely
the level at which the question arises how a particular national economy adapts to the
availability or non-availability of  material  and human resources.  An interesting issue
arises at this level for the particular nations we are concerned with. Why is it that the
four  nations  with  the  smallest  endowment  in  natural  resources  and  the  most
unfavourable relation between population and space, and this is true of Japan as well, are
the most advanced in industrialization in the region? Some specialists of Japan offer an
interesting  variation  of  Ricardo's  theory  of  comparative  advantage:  the  more
disadvantaged by scarcity of resources, exiguity of space and distance from its foreign
markets,  they  argue,  the  greater  a  country's  incentive  to  specialize  in  exports  of
manufactured goods with the highest possible added-value23.
 
Goal Attainment
41 Another answer might be sought in the next Parsonian function: goal attainment. The
economy does not stand isolated but is in constant reciprocal relations with the other
subsystems. The polity, that is, the organization of political institutions, has the task of
mobilizing forces for the attainment of system goals. Therefore, if the economy is the
producer of wealth, the polity has the power to use its wealth to attain collective goals.
The most fascinating level of analysis at which this Parsonian function can be applied is of
course  that  of  economic  policy,  more  particularly,  its  border-relation  with  the
autonomous factors of the economy.
42 Starting after World War II with few natural resources, abundance of cheap unskilled
labour  and  little  foreign  currency  in  an  environment  determined  by  the  East-West
conflict  and  the  Chinese  and  Korean  partition,  these  four  countries  have  resolutely
engaged  in  a  policy  of  export-led  growth,  as  explained,  in  step  with  the  expanding
international  trade.  Since  the  late  1960s,  they  shifted  their  investments  whenever
international demand shifted. There was massive government targeting, and government
demand, even in Hong Kong which next to Japan was one of the economic beneficiaries of
the Korean and Vietnam wars. But such government guidance both led and followed the
changes in the international division of labour under way on a global scale. Government
activities and autonomous factors were inextricably intertwined. Whatever the mixture,
the comparative advantages built up by the Four in the process are "man-made", not a
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natural endowment such as the proverbial English wheat and the Portuguese wine of
classical Ricardian trade theory. They are the long-run structural effects of determined
economic  policies  and  thus  one  of  the  best  illustrations  of  why  it  is  important  to
distinguish analytically between structure and action as in proposition one stated above.
43 Long-term goals  were  consistently  more  important  than short-term ones  for  policy-
makers of the four governments. As in Japan24, it is not easy to asses the importance of
short-term Keynesian policies in the Asian NIEs. Since the saving/ investment balance
was tipped towards investment in the first two postwar decades in all four of them, there
was no typical situation for Keynesian domestic stimulus. Long-term development of the
supply side was in the center of the preoccupations of the policy-makers from the end of
the  war  until  today.  On  the  other  hand,  the  four  economies  took  advantage  of  the
external  demand-pull  that  resulted  from  Keynesian  demand  management  in  their
customers countries in the industrialized world.
44 And finally, we must not overlook the effect of the maintenance of undervalued exchange
rates which have been associated ever since the 1930s with Keynesian theory. Although it
requires  day-to-day  intervention  and  reaction  to  short-term  movements  in  foreign
exchange markets, exchange rate policy in the four NIEs up to the end of the 1980s is best
understood in the framework of long-term trade policy, as are the more microeconomic
measures of infant industry protection mentioned earlier.
45 As a basic  characterization,  I  submit  that,  in Tinbergen's  categories  of  the theory of
economic policy, qualitative structural policies prevailed over the orthodox quantitative
fiscal and monetary policy mix, pragmatic trial-and-error methods over macroeconomic
fine-tuning, individual methodology over aggregate methodology, critical rationalism in
dynamic development over dogmatic thinking in static models. There is massive evidence
of unorthodox policy-making, from Hong Kong's "Austrian" laissez-faire to Korea's state-
guided build-up of the supply side.
46 Hong Kong's case is important as it is an even more striking example than Japan how the
"Austrian"  reluctance  to  engage  in  any  sort  of  government's  policy-making  can  be
overcome in an environment otherwise determined by the untrammelled market model.
Its policy-makers have discovered that there are times when free enterprise can fail to
produce Schumpeterian dynamism. The concern over Hong Kong's electronics industry
loosing out against Korean and Taiwanese industries has pushed the government in 1988
to what officials call "a radical departure". The government is entering the business of
what  it  calls  "developmental  support".  It  is  setting  up  among  others,  a  digital
communications laboratory and a customized micro-chip design center. It also reverts to
a sort of "picking-up-the-winner" strategy by employing consultants to study promising
new technologies  with  potential  industrial  applications,  and  to  recommend  whether
support services should be provided to them.
47 Both Taiwan and Korea have much larger research organizations with the dual role of
training  engineers  and  transferring  core  technology.  For  example,  the  Taiwanese
Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI) is developing a new motorcycle engine
controlled  by  a  microprocessor  reducing  fuel  consumption  and  pollution.  Korean
government research institutions are cooperating with major corporate conglomerates
such as Samsung, Goldstar and Hyundai to develop new turboblades for aircraft engines
and the next generation of memory chips,  the 4 Mega-byte DRAM (Dynamic Random
Access Memory).
The Asian Newly Industrialized Economies: A Universal Model of Action
Civilisations, 40-1 | 1991
11
48 Taiwan and Korea come closest to imitating Japanese government-funded precompetitive
research cooperation, which in our book on Japan we have proposed to label with the
verbal  monster  of  state-guided  private  polypolistic  supply-push  innovation.  The
comparison is not quite complete though because of the more reduced number of big
high technology firms Korea and Taiwan can boast. Post-research competition in the four
NIEs can hardly be called polypolistic but oligopolistic at best. If there is one thing that is
unique about Japan, it is the wealth and diversity of its corporate landscape in almost any
industrial sector. I submit this is what endows Japan with the unmatched dynamism and
competitivity of its industry and allows it to watch competition from the Asian NIEs with
relative calm. Thanks to its relative bigness and the high degree of competition in its own
industries, Japan can face the so-called Boomerang Effect of its investments and trade
with the Asian NIEs and still remain an unrivalled leader in technological innovation25.
 
Integration
49 At  the  same  level-of-analysis  of  economic  policy,  the  third  Parsonian  function,  the
integrative function, would be defined as the guidance, enforcement or control system
assuring the implementation of policies through means of law, customs, or mere moral
persuasion. There is a great deal of variety among Asian economies in this area as well.
For one, none of the Four can boast such a superbly Colbertist or Prussian bureaucray as
Japan.  And  Chalmers  Johnson's  formula  of  a  "soft  authoritarianism"  as  a  common
explanation of assured implementation of policies in the four cases is both oversimplified
and outdated.
50 Not much more helpful are the various models developed by political scientists in order
to  capture  Japan's  supposedly  unique  government-business  relationship,  such  as  the
"bargaining  model",  the  "quasi-command  model",  and  the  "network  model"26.  Their
conceptual sophistication may serve to feature what is special about Japan, but it is not
very good at explaining comparative results in terms of policy implementation. That does
not mean that the Japanese case cannot serve as an example. But I argue that the case
must  be  explained  in  categories  easily  applicable  to  other  economies  as  well.  These
categories should be as close to generally used economic and legal theory as possible. In
our  work  on  Japan's  strategic  pragmatism,  we  have  distinguished  five  models  of
integration, the absence or presence of which in other countries can suggest a great deal
about why policy implementation has been effective or not27. They are:
• administrative guidance,
• implicit contracts,
• preparedness to establish a hierarchy between conflicting economic policies,
• and finally, what Adolf Lowe, in his theory of economic knowledge, has called "secondary
controls".
51 Administrative  guidance  is  a  Japanese  specialty  only  at  first  sight.  Governments
everywhere signal preferred courses of action to economic agents all over the world, only
in a much less systematic fashion than in Japan, and only with bad conscience as it were.
Keynesian policy incentives, subsidies, tax breaks, and the like occur everywhere and are
signals to the beneficiaries about how they should behave. As in Japan, such guidance is
non-compulsory. Freedom of choice is maintained. Japan has managed to develop the
instrument in systematic fashion as one that relies less on material incentives than on
moral  persuasion  in  explaining  the  stakes  that  are  involved  in  solving  problems
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confronting  the  government,  households  or  firms.  A  country  that  is  both  large  and
democratic like Japan requires an exceptionally qualified bureaucracy to operate such a
system with success.
52 Governments  of  smaller  countries  like  the  NIEs  may  manage  with  less  formidable
bureaucratic standards. The evidence of such guidance is massive in Korea, Taiwan and
Singapore.  Authoritarianism  may  have  compensated  any  lack  of  legal  sophistication
before  democratisation  and  liberalisation  set  in.  But  it  is  by  no  means  a  necessary
condition.  Hong  Kong  proves  that  administrative  guidance  can  function  in  an  ideal
laissez-faire regime. The Governor has used this instrument sparingly, but there is no
doubt that the small, though powerful, business community of the Colony would think
twice before refusing, without a sensible reason, his moral persuasion.
53 This brings me to the second model, which covers a significant part of the first: implicit
contracts or "gentlemen's agreements". They raise the level of administrative guidance
from a unilateral to a bilateral one. Many Japanese believe that Japan has the monopoly of
that instrument. Arguments reach from their cultural tradition of not putting contracts
into writing, to their reluctance even to spell out commitments of loyalty, and to their
highly developed sense of give-and-take. This instrument, however, is used for economic
policy purposes in the West as well.  The term "gentlemen's agreement",  although of
British  origin,  has  entered  global  terminology  and  covers  the  same  type  of  implicit
commitments.  One  particularly  striking  non-Asian  example  are  the  gentlemen's
agreements concluded by the German Bundesbank, known to be one of the most orthodox
neoclassical  institution of  the world,  with leading German banks in order to prevent
capital movements running counter to the exchange rate of the deutsche mark prefered
by the Bundesbank for reasons of domestic price stability.
54 In Asia, Hong Kong, for obvious reasons, has not difficulty with the term and the practice.
As for Korea and Taiwan, the pattern is epitomized by the October 1987 stock market
crash situation when banks, solicited by government, agreed in the true Japanese fashion
to mobilize considerable funds in support of share prices in order to restore confidence.
The banks complied, and so did the public. Everyone benefited from the recovery made
possible by this implicitly gregarious move.
55 Notwithstanding their differences, all four NIEs are managed by a closely knit corporatist
network, comparable in many ways with Japanese and Central European corporatism.
With authoritarian rule on the decline, the decision-making process is increasingly losing
its top-down unilateral direction. To cite the Financial Times28, "governments have come to
recognise their own weakness in assessing how market trends will move worldwide for
different  products,  and  to  realise  their  administrations  are  overstrained".  It  is
increasingly difficult to know where the center of decision lies, even in the most dirigist
of the four,  namely Korea. Consensual modes of policy-making and implicit contracts
have increasingly become the pattern of policy integration.
56 Secondary controls are one of the Western concepts that had to wait for Japan and the
Asian NIEs, as it were, to be practiced in pioneering fashion. Economic incentives, macro-
and microeconomic ones are offered by governments everywhere on the basis of the
theoretical assumption of the reaction of economic agents. Lowe calls these incentives
"primary" controls of the economy. All too often, there are no "secondary" controls as to
whether  or  not  beneficiaries  of  the  incentives  performed  in  accordance  with  the
assumption underlying the primary controls.  Considerations of  fairness  as  well  as  of
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policy effectiveness call for "sanctions" in case of noncompliance. Such sanctions cannot
be of a penal nature but merely consist of swift discontinuation of the incentives or the
exclusion of non-complying beneficiaries.
57 Thanks to a highly performing bureaucracy, Japan has had no problems with secondary
controls.  Thanks  to  their  relatively  small  size  and  the  corporatist  virtue  of  their
economies, the governments  of  Korea,  Singapore,  and Taiwan could easily  manage a
similar system. Hong Kong's history of government incentives is extremely recent, as we
have seen, but it evolves along the same lines.
58 One example I could cite is the story of the determined action of the Monetary Authority
of Singapore (MAS) in 1985. The MAS had offered extremely favourable conditions to
foreign banks for establishing themselves both in the domestic and off-shore markets.
The off-shore facilities were the incentive provided for operating a domestic branch. The
purpose was attraction of foreign capital. When Singapore was hit by a cyclical recession,
the MAS attempted to reach with the major banks a gentlemen's agreement of the type
just described in the case of the Bundesbank. The aim of the agreement was to offset a
speculating run out of the Singapore dollar. The MAS argued that a cheaper dollar would
increase  the  cost  of  imported  components  of  manufactured  goods  and  thus  ruin
Singapore's price competitivity as only 20 percent of export prices depended on wage and
locally made components. Facing the non-compliance with the gentlemen's agreement,
the MAS was provoked into applying the secondary controls of revoking the primary
incentive of freedom of transactions between domestic and off-shore markets29.
59 There were marked differences in the choice of hierarchy between conflicting economic
policies among the Four, but the choices were made as pragmatically and decidedly as in
Japan and with much less doctrinal  inhibitions than in Europe.  For example,  Taiwan
subordinated industrial policy to neoclassical competition policy unequivocally, but did
not reject industrial policy altogether, as West Germany still feels obliged to do. Korea
and  Singapore,  just  as  unequivocally,  subjected  concerns  of  fair  trade  to  those  of
industrial policy, while Hong Kong left it to its Schumpeterian entrepreneurs to fight
among themselves over the concrete shape of market forms in the advanced sectors of
the economy. Small and medium-size enterprises were also left to their fate, not only in
Hong  Kong,  but  in  Taiwan  and  Singapore,  while  they  were  mostly  integrated  in  a
conglomerate network in Korea as in Japan.
60 Japan has been the pioneer of managing trade to prevent market disruptions in importing
countries. Here, too, a clear hierarchy of policies was established. Fair trade policy would
serve trade policy through legalisation of exporting cartels setting percentage shares of
firms  in  total  exports  of  designated  goods  to  importing  countries  threatening
protectionist action. Managing markets this way is wholely contested by economic theory
because, preventing short-term market disruptions is not its only effect. In the long run,
it is intended to guarantee all the more secure market penetration. In addition, it offers
exporters  that  extra  rent  of  scarcity  resulting from reduced supply  at  higher  prices
(example: Honda cars in Europe and America). Importing countries are not well advised
to call for such export restraints, but they regularly do so nonetheless, when faced with
overcompetitive supply from East Asia, most prominently the U.S. and the EC. Korea and
Taiwan have imitated the Japanese example and have penetrated the U.S. market all the
more effectively.
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Pattern Maintenance
61 The pattern maintenance function is that part of Parsons' framework covering the field in
which  most  Asian  experts  specialize:  tradition,  culture,  value  systems,  in  short,
everything that is different in Asia as compared to the rest of the world, or, in each of the
four countries, as compared to the other three and the rest of the world. While relegating
such particular structural  conditions to the periphery of  theoretical  interest  in their
characteristic  ceteris  paribus  propositions,  even  general  equilibrium  theorists  do
recognize the impact of structure as axiomatic, i.e. as not having to be proved.
62 This is the field of cultural explanations of economic performance, such as the thesis that
only Confucianism made Japan's, Korea's and Taiwan's performance possible, and only
Asian countries with Chinese majorities like Hong Kong and Singapore could emulate that
performance. Followers of this approach have the problem of explaining the People's
Republic of China's lesser performance. There is a wide consensus that below the large
official Marxist doctrine, Confucian values are still deeply rooted in Mainland China as
well.
63 The monocausal Confucian explanation of the outstanding performance of the Asian NIEs
is not well equipped to explain China's economic troubles before as well as after Mao.
What  is  needed,  is  a  functional  approach balancing adaptation,  goal  attainment,  and
integration with cultural values (pattern maintenance). The functional approach helps
focusing on adaptive dysfunctions of China's Marxist economy, especially in the area of
price  determination  and  production  planning,  which  Deng's  modernization  program
hopes to overcome. It can lead to the comprehension of the practical problems of a less
than perfect bureaucracy in a big country, in terms of the integrative function. It also
invites  increased attention to  the  potential  of  pragmatic  action across  the  cleavages
between centralized government policy and decentralized market decisions in China's
future as a two-economic-orders-in-one-state case30.
64 Such functional  explanation seems over-ambitious  to  many,  as  it  covers  the  field  of
various disciplines in a holistic framework. But in fact, it is less ambitious and conforms
better to the scientific standard of critical rationalism than monocausal explanations in
terms of only one of the disciplines it covers.
65 The same is true if we shift away from the level of analysis of societal macrostructures to
the level of particular patterns of each of the four Asian NIEs. There is much diversity, but
are also crucial similarities. In all the four cases, we have dualist economies as in Japan.
There  is  the  duality  of  traditional  and  advanced sectors,  of  the  multitude  of  small
enterprises and big conglomerates, of wages of temporary and permanent workers, of
lifetime and temporary employment. The social cost involved in some of these dualities is
considerable,  but  on the  whole,  they account  for  a  sizeable  part  of  the  capacity  for
economic and social adjustment in the NIEs. On average, all sectors of their societies have
greatly benefited from that adaptive performance. The functional relation of adaptation
and pattern maintenance is obvious here.
66 There are many more structural patterns worth analyzing and I will mention only one
more to  which I  have  already referred earlier:  the  saving performance.  A far  above
average saving propensity is common to all four. The average gross saving rate for the
Four turns around 33 percent over the period 1980-1986, similar to that of Japan's 32
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percent, and more than double that of the U.S.' 15 percent, or that of the U.K., Australia
and New Zealand, which also happen to be the biggest customers of the NIEs.
67 Nothing catches the dynamism of the four economies better than the fact that, even at
this staggering saving rate, the saving/investment balance was tilted towards investment
in all four cases during most of the postwar decades, until the mid-1980s. The balance was
settled at an extremely high level indeed.
68 I admit that there is a feed-back loop to Confucian explanation since frugality and saving
do  rank  high  in  Confucian  values.  But  there  is  a  catch  to  this.  It  does  not  explain
everything.  The same frugality and attachment to saving rank high in the theory of
Western capitalism, Weberian or not. Capitalism is a pluralistic affair in terms of religions
31. The question remains why other capitalist countries have performed less well than the
Asian NIEs.  Healthy  capitalism may thus  be  a  necessary  condition of  high economic
performance, but not a sufficient one. To the question of what the sufficient condition
ought  to  be,  I  have a  tentative  answer:  a  functional  approach to  theory,  a  strategic
pragmatism in economic policy, and a flexible balance between private and public policy
activities.
 
Table 1: Selected foreign trade indicators (1989)
 Hong Kong Korea Singapore Taiwan Japan
as % of GPD 232,00 66,00 369,00 98,50 35,40
% of trade with Japan 12,00 25,00 15,60 14,50  
% of trade with US 17,00 31,00 24,00 38,70 29,10
Total 29,00 56,00 39,60 53,30  
Export: % of manufactured goods 87,00 94,70 25,60 86,40 93,10
Import: of raw material 50,00 38,60 8,70 64,50 33,10
Energy 2,00 5,80 26,60 7,60 34,00
Source: Far Eastern Economic Review: Asia Yearbook 1990, pp. 8-9.
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Table 2: Selected Performance figures (1988)
 Hong Kong Korea Singapore Taiwan Japan
per capita
income US$
9 643 4 040 8 162 5 520 15 500
GDP real
growth 88%
7,30 16,00 11,00 7,34 5,10
% avg. growth GDP 84-88 8,40 17,50  9,71 4,52
Source: Far Eastern Economic Review: Asia Yearbook 1990, pp. 8-9.
 
Table 3: Selected Foreign Trade Indicators (1983)
 Hong Kong Korea Singapore Taiwan Japan
As % of GNP 163.6* 84.4 306.4 101 29.7
% of trade with Japan 17.9 19.0 14.2 17.8 -
% of trade with the US 26.2 28.7 16.5 35.0 24.7
Total 44.1 47.7 30.7 52.8 -














*GDP and not GNP
Source: Far Eastern Economic Review, Asia Yearbook 1985, pp. 8-10.
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ABSTRACTS
Most observers of the Pacific Basin economies have been looking at socio-cultural explanations of
the success the so-called "NIEs", i.e. South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong, have had in
developing their economies in the last  three decades.  While these explanations are certainly
worthwhile, they are not sufficient. We propose another one: strategic pragmatism. Pragmatism
is  a  virtue usually  associated with Americans,  but  Japan,  and in  its  wake,  the NIEs,  practice
pragmatism in their economic decisions. They do not shun one or the other economic theory on
doctrinary grounds, but use any one of them as suits the need of the particular industrial sector
they want to develop. They make the distinction between structure and action and tend to act
even in conditions of uncertainty. They base their economic strategy on consensual relations
between public and private sectors, and try to maintain a minimum of peace in labour relations.
They  are  part  of  the  world  economy  and  are  tuned  to  any  change  in  demand  and  in  the
international division of labour. They tend to adapt structures to the need of action and they in
turn try to follow Schumpeter's precept of creating a new demand for their new products. In a
few  words,  their  economy  is  characterized  by  active  government  involvement,  a  reluctant




Chargée de cours à l'Université Catholique de Louvain
The Asian Newly Industrialized Economies: A Universal Model of Action
Civilisations, 40-1 | 1991
19
